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Law and Social Norms in Contractual Relationships
Oskari Juurikkala1
Abstract
Law is important – but not as important as many lawyers believe. Evidence 
from different countries demonstrates that businessmen rely more on social norms 
than on legal rights and duties. Sometimes law is even deliberately avoided. 
Social norms and informal practices can also be enforced through a variety of 
non-legal sanctions. Law is still relevant, especially in non-continuous relation-
ships and so-called end-game situations. But legal norms are most relevant and 
efficient when they are well-aligned with social norms. 
Full Article
1 Introduction
It seems to be a universal phenomenon among human beings that we over-
value our own field of interest and expertise, and undervalue that with 
which we are less knowledgeable and comfortable. The present article chal-
lenges that legal centralism of lawyers and legal scholars by showing that, in 
ordinary life, law plays a role that is entirely secondary to a range of social 
norms that govern human relationships.
There is a burgeoning academic literature on law and social norms.2 This 
article focuses on the role of legal and social norms in the governance of 
contractual relationships. The first part reviews two empirical studies which 
look at business practices in two sample countries, the United States and 
1 LL.B. (English Law), M.Sc. (Economics). Financial support from the Emil Aaltonen 
Foundation and the Acton Institute are gratefully acknowledged.
2 The theme is certainly not a new one, but recent years have evidenced an increasing 
theoretical interest in the relationship between these phenomena, especially in Law and 
Economics. Mercuro and Medema 2006, chapter 7, is a good introduction. Ellickson 
1991 is almost a modern classic which helped to inspire interest in the topic. More re-
cently, several journals have hosted special issues on this topic.
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Taiwan. The second part examines different theories about the relationship 
between social norms and law. The third part discusses some of the implica-
tions and challenges of the theory.
2 Empirical Evidence on Legal and Social Norms in Business Re-
lationships
2.1 Non-contractual Business Relationships in the United States
Stewart Macaulay’s classic article “Non-Contractual Relations in Business” 
is a fascinating empirical investigation of the contrasting roles of legal and 
non-legal norms in business.3 The study was based on interviews with busi-
nessmen and lawyers of firms based in Wisconsin, USA. In the following, 
I summarize some of the key findings of that study. Although they may be 
obvious to many businessmen, they are equally surprising – perhaps even 
shocking – to many lawyers and law students.
Firstly, there is the issue of general attitudes. A lawyer might presume that 
law has a central place in business relationships. Not necessarily so, says 
Macaulay. He found that most businessmen claim they prefer a handshake 
or “a man’s word” to legal contracts, despite the fact that their lawyers ex-
pressly disapprove of their attitude. For businessmen, “let’s do the deal” 
means defining only broadly what is to be done and what the price will be 
– specific legal contracts are a secondary matter.
Secondly, the study discovered that many contracts might be legally un-
enforceable – and businessmen do not necessarily see this as a major issue. 
It often happens that both parties include their standard forms into their 
communications, thereby trying to insert those conditions into the con-
tract. This so-called ”battle of the forms” means that sometimes there is no 
clear agreement on which party’s standard form governs the relationship, 
and consequently there may be no contract at all (for lack of acceptance) 
or its terms may be open to question. Macaulay adds that the companies 
in the investigation not infrequently made “requirements contracts” (i.e., 
contracts to supply a firm’s requirements of an item rather than a definite 
3 Macaulay 1963.
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quantity), which were probably unenforceable under Wisconsin law at the 
time; however, “none [of the businessmen] thought that the lack of legal 
sanctions made any difference.”4
Thirdly, businessmen were found to shun legal disputes. As a matter of fact, 
many contracts were well negotiated and planned, but even then disputes 
were rarely based on the strict legal obligations; flexible adjustments to legal 
rights were common. An example is the cancellation of orders: in law, the 
seller would be entitled to demand full payment, but actually cancellations 
were commonly accepted without complaints. As one lawyer explained:
“Often businessmen do not feel they have “a contract” – rather they 
have “an order.” They speak of “canceling the order” rather than 
“breaching our contract.” When I began practice I referred to order 
cancellations as breaches of contract, but my clients objected since 
they do not think of cancellation as wrong. Most clients, in heavy 
industry at least, believe that there is a right to cancel as part of the 
buyer-seller relationship. There is a widespread attitude that one can 
back out of any deal within some very vague limits. Lawyers are often 
surprised by this attitude.”5
Consequently, lawsuits seemed to be extremely rare in comparison to the 
number of disputes that arise. One purchasing agent said: “If something 
comes up, you get the other man on the telephone and deal with the prob-
lem. You don’t read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want 
to do business again. One doesn’t run to lawyers if he wants to stay in busi-
ness because one must behave decently.”6
One may ask how universally applicable the findings of this study would 
be across different industries, countries and types of business. Neverthe-
less, the evidence in Macaulay’s study reveals a fundamental gap between 
the legal centralism of most lawyers and the pragmatic anti-legalism of most 
businessmen. 
4 Ibid., p. 60.
5 Ibid., p. 61.
6 Ibid. 
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2.2 Informal Business Practices in Taiwan
Social norms may be more important than law in other contexts too, as 
Jane Winn demonstrates in her interesting theoretical and empirical study 
of small business practices in Taiwan.7 The author notes that the ”economic 
miracle” of Taiwan after the 1960s is usually attributed to the legal and 
institutional reforms made by the Taiwanese government – reforms which 
boosted foreign investments and export industries. Winn argues that this 
account of Taiwan’s economic history does not reflect the reality of domestic 
business. It has been estimated that more than 50% of all economic activity 
in Taiwan is conducted not just domestically, but also in the ”informal sec-
tor”, that is, outside ordinary legal relationships.
Winn studied Taiwanese business practices through a range of interviews 
with lawyers, judges, business people, government officials and even some 
members of criminal gangs. She found strong support for the commonly 
held belief that in Chinese society, the authority of the law is relatively weak, 
whereas relations and connections have a normative role above that of for-
mal legal rules. The roots of this setting can be found in traditional Chinese 
culture: according to the Confucian ideal, human relationships and rituals 
are the basis for cooperative relationships, while the function of the law 
is limited to that of inflicting punishments in cases of social misconduct. 
Thus law plays a secondary role, reinforcing the primary social reality, which 
pre-exists above legal rules and operates mostly in ignorance of formal law. 
Winn argues that although values may be changing, this attitude towards 
law is still reflected in present-day Taiwan – even among lawyers.
Winn depicts the Chinese relational system as follows: in Chinese culture, 
the “self ” is primarily constituted by relationships, especially family relation-
ships. Beyond family ties, connections (guanxi) are of central importance. 
The term refers to something more than ”networking” in Western societies: 
guanxi relations are forged through repeated dealings where there are strong 
unwritten rules of reciprocity such as doing favors, maintaining ”face” etc. 
An important point is that, according to the author, dealing with strangers 
is considered problematic and even dangerous.
7 Winn 1994.
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Winn however argues that the traditional culture is not the only reason for 
the marginal role of the law. Law is considered oppressive partly because of 
the authoritarian political reality of Kuomintang rule – an authoritarianism 
that extended to the legal system. Taiwanese legislation is considered “laby-
rinthine”, rigidly formalistic and often incompatible with social realities.8 
The law is often tied to politics through the so-called ”exercise of official 
discretion”. For example, gross violations of law might be tolerated for long 
periods of time, but selective enforcement of laws may be employed to har-
ass political dissidents.9
On the empirical level, Winn’s study focuses on small businesses. One ex-
ample is tax evasion, which seems to be common among Taiwanese small 
enterprises. Tax evasion is often done through misreporting, for example 
by using multiple account books (a practice that seems to be widespread in 
other countries too, such as Russia). The author says that many legal meas-
ures have been implemented to fight against these practices, but the effect 
has been questionable. The role of social norms is crucial: successful tax eva-
sion requires the cooperation of many individuals, including accountants 
and some tax officials. Cooperation is possible due to the fact that relational 
obligations are considered normatively superior to legal obligations, and 
because public authorities are widely seen as lacking full legitimacy.
Winn also found that business dealings among small businesses are usu-
ally done without formal contracts. One consequence of this is that organ-
ized crime has gained an important role in the society, because it plays “a 
significant role in policing transactions in the informal sector.”10 Whether 
this is an efficient solution is a separate issue; in any case, it does seem that 
criminal gangs can provide necessary assistance for debt collection. Some 
gangsters even have business cards in which they are represented as officers 
of companies offering dispute resolution and debt collection.
Why then are formal contracts avoided? Winn’s interviewees said that courts 
are often seen as unhelpful, because they follow rigid rules and require for-
mal documentation, which may be lacking. Moreover, even if one succeeds 
8   Winn 1994, p. 203.
9   Ibid., p. 202.
10 Ibid., p. 209.
Helsinki Law Review 2009  
54
in obtaining a favorable judgment, it can be difficult to locate the assets of 
the debtor due to complex family ownership structures and dubious ac-
counting practices. In such an institutional setting, a real but controlled 
threat by gang members can induce the debtor to use his guanxi to find the 
means to honor the debt.
The face of informal business in Taiwan reveals a different picture of the re-
lationship between law and social norms – a picture that seems to be tied to 
the cultural and political history of the country and its people. Note, how-
ever, that Winn’s findings may be widely applicable in a range of less devel-
oped countries such as India, or countries in Africa and Latin America.11
3 Different Relationships Between Law and Social Norms
3.1 Non-legal Sanctions
The empirical findings reviewed above demonstrate that the relevance of so-
cial norms is more than a mere sociological moot point. The more challeng-
ing question concerns how the relationship between law and social norms 
should be framed theoretically. In the following sections I review some of 
the key discussions and arguments on the role of non-legal sanctions, the 
different uses of law, and debates concerning the efficiency of law and social 
norms.
One way to look at the issue is to distinguish between legal and non-legal 
sanctioning mechanisms.12 An interesting investigation on this has been 
made by David Charny, who investigates different types of commitments 
and sanctions that may govern commercial relationships.13 He notes that 
there are at least three different types of non-legal sanctions.
11 See for example the discussion on “informal trade” in de Soto’s 1989 work on extra-
legal or “underground” economic activity in Peru.
12 The role of sanctions plays a central role in Anglo-American legal thought, because 
traditional English legal positivism tended to view laws as mere “commands backed 
by sanctions”. Continental European legal theory is different in its emphasis on law 
as a normative system. This is also reflected in terminology: in the United States, legal 
scholars often use “norms” as a short-hand for social norms; in contrast, Finnish lawyers 
use the word “norms” to refer to legal norms.
13 Charny 1990. See also Panther 2000 for a review of related literature.
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Firstly, there are “bonds” between the parties themselves. These may take 
the form of “relationship-specific prospective advantages”, such as relation-
specific investments, which pay considerably less outside the present rela-
tion. In repeated-deal situations, the loss of trust also creates high indirect 
economic costs.
Secondly, Charny refers to reputation among market participants (potential 
transactors) as a basis for non-legal sanctions. He notes that reputation is 
important not only in business-to-business markets but also in consumer 
goods markets. For example, the existence of brand value increases the cost 
of losing a good reputation, thereby giving strong non-legal incentives to 
behave fairly. An important issue with regard to the effectiveness of this 
type of sanction is the dissemination of information to other market par-
ticipants. One reason why some markets (e.g., lawyers, doctors, financial 
advisors) may require heavier legal regulation is that many clients in these 
markets are inexperienced or infrequent buyers of the services and will find 
it difficult to assess the objective reputation of service providers.
Thirdly, there are internal sanctions, which Charny calls loss of “psychic and 
social goods.” He notes that companies often try to encourage valuable in-
ternal sanctions by creating strong ”corporate cultures” so that employees 
become emotionally attached to their firm, wanting to behave loyally and 
regretting if they must change jobs. In support of this theory, one should 
mention the work of Bruno Frey.14 Building on extensive empirical work in 
motivational psychology, Frey shows that increasing monitoring and exter-
nal incentives does not always have the desired effect on work effort, because 
external incentives can in some circumstances negatively shape the internal 
attitudes of trust, loyalty and working for the honor of doing a good job. 
This can easily be applied to business relationships: trust and loyalty are key 
ingredients of successful business, and that must be taken into account in 
contract negotiating.
Charny also argues that firm-employee relations are strongly influenced by 
non-legal incentives and sanctions – and this is true both ways. There are 
various sanctions, which may include relationship-specific prospective ad-
14 Frey 1993, 1997.
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vantages, reputational concerns and internal sanctions. That may explain 
why parties often pay so little attention to the formal details of employment 
contracts in the employment process, and not infrequently there is no writ-
ten contract of employment. Prudent employees (and employers) should of 
course check that there are no onerous contract terms, but many important 
discussions, agreements and expectations are routinely left outside the writ-
ten contract of employment.
Macaulay’s empirical evidence is consistent with the preceding framework. 
He shows that most of business is quite possible without enforceable con-
tracts, given the existence and strength of various social norms that support 
business relationships. For example: it is unpleasant for company personnel 
if things are not done right with business partners, so it is better to act in 
accordance with agreements; salesmen often know purchasing agents well, 
give mutual favors, go to dinner together etc. Top executives often belong 
to similar societies and clubs, the likelihood of future business forces com-
panies to maintain a good reputation and failure to pay would result in 
blacklisting, negative gossip and the like.
Macaulay’s evidence also shows that businessmen think that negotiating 
detailed contracts can harm good relationships, and talking about remote 
contingencies can result in losing the deal. Frey’s theory of intrinsic motiva-
tion seems to apply too: The businessmen Macaulay studied had learnt that 
if you make a detailed contract, you only receive according to the letter of 
the contract; but if you build relationships of trust, people are more flexible, 
even generous. Negotiating too many details indicates lack of trust, and 
may result in a loss of flexibility. Vague obligations may actually work better 
than precise ones (even though lawyers hate vague obligations), because it 
is easier to renegotiate them in light of the actual circumstances which may 
be impossible to predict. Finally, threatening to take things to a lawyer can 
be dangerous, because by doing so one can insult the other party, who in 
consequence will retaliate and may refuse to negotiate peacefully. When this 
happens, the loss of time and money may escalate.
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3.2 The Uses and Abuses of Law
The empirical evidence reviewed earlier showed that law is in some contexts 
less important than many lawyers think. The theory of non-legal sanctions 
also reveals that legal sanctions play only a minor role in many contexts. 
This raises some obvious questions: why does law matter at all? Why do 
businessmen write contracts if they prefer not to rely on them? Is law more 
important in some contexts than in others?
Charny lists several reasons why commercial contracting parties prefer to 
rely on non-legal commitments: the costs of drafting can be high; it is dif-
ficult to know all contingencies in advance and to weigh their likelihood; 
informality can help to nurture trust between the parties, etc. On the other 
hand, legal proceedings are relevant in some circumstances, even though 
they are generally seen as the most costly and unpleasant dispute resolution 
mechanism. Sometimes the success of informal negotiations also requires 
the backing of at least a theoretical threat of going to court. Thus to neglect 
law altogether would be to miss the full picture and throw the baby out with 
the bathwater.
Macaulay’s empirical findings support this view. The businessmen inter-
viewed said that contracts are sometimes necessary, for example when there 
are clear risks that must be provided for. Litigation may also be worth the 
money and time in some special cases. But there are also some surprising 
reasons to make written and even detailed contracts. For example, saying 
”I’ll have my lawyer review it” can be used as a delaying tactic, whereby one 
keeps the negotiations alive while still looking around for alternatives with-
out committing oneself. In large companies, detailed contracts may also be 
used for internal communication, because they specify the relevant details 
to production departments, accountants etc.
Yet there is more to it, as Lisa Bernstein’s insightful paper demonstrates.15 
She observes that there are many reasons why trading partners may actually 
prefer some aspects of their agreements and relationships to be legally unen-
forceable. Commercial customs and social norms allow business transactors 
15 Bernstein 1996.
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to modify written contract terms for a range of potential non-legal reasons. 
Bernstein poses the question of why businessmen do not incorporate all of 
these factors into the express agreement. She answers by pointing out three 
potential difficulties.
Firstly, there are signaling effects. Negotiating remote contingencies into the 
contract may be inappropriate, because it may signal distrust or unusual de-
sire to litigate. Or, as was said earlier, one may fear that it would make things 
too inflexible if circumstances change. Secondly, there are legal system costs. 
Legal system costs refer to litigation costs, delays, and the risk of judicial 
error. Because of these costs, commercial transactors want to avoid unneces-
sary litigation. A good example given by Bernstein is the software industry: 
it is usual to disclaim all legal warranties, but at the same time to promise (in 
legally unenforceable ways) to fix defective products. The apparent incon-
sistency is explained by one expert as follows: software companies fear that 
some customers will initiate unreasonable litigation, and software suits are 
always very expensive to defend and could ruin the business. Finally, there 
is a difference between observable and verifiable information. Although many 
relevant factors can be observed by the transacting parties, they may not be 
verified by a third party. This is true of complex software cases, as mentioned. 
Bernstein also says that when businessmen are forging new relationships, it 
is difficult to know the trustworthiness of the other party. Trustworthiness 
can be observed later on, but it cannot be measured and verified in a legally 
enforceable way. Thus it can be better to have a strict written contract in 
case the other party turns out to be untrustworthy, but otherwise to govern 
the relationship with a more flexible relational agreement.
Bernstein proposes an interesting distinction that makes more sense of the 
interplay between law and social norms. She differentiates between what 
she calls (a) relationship-preserving norms and (b) end-game norms. Relation-
ship-preserving norms are flexible and easily adjustable, and they facilitate 
cooperative dispute resolution. End-game norms, in contrast, govern the 
relationship when the parties do not intend to do business again, and there-
fore the norms are strict and clear. Bernstein believes that commercial par-
ties will rationally want to separate these two types of norms: end-game 
norms should not be available when the cooperative business relationship 
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is alive and well, given the limitations of contractual and law-based rules. 
In contrast, it is good to have those end-game norms in place in case the 
relationship goes sour; thus neither party can abuse the cooperative nature 
of relationship-preserving norms.
Macaulay’s evidence is broadly consistent with Bernstein’s theory, and we 
need not recite it again. Bernstein provides addition empirical support for 
her hypothesis. She provides a detailed description of the National Grain 
and Feed Association’s (NGFA) membership arbitration system, which is 
composed of industry experts. On the one hand, NGFA practices are very 
flexible when cooperation is ongoing, but when things go to arbitration, the 
tribunal sticks to the written contracts – and the members prefer it this way. 
For example, relationship-preserving norms in NGFA usually “split the dif-
ference,” whereas arbitration proceedings do not, and Bernstein’s interviews 
confirm that this is what NGFA members prefer. Written contracts also of-
ten specify the use of official weights, but because this is expensive, in-house 
weights are accepted in practice; however if it turns that the other party may 
have been cheating, one can rely on the written terms of the contract and 
demand compensation. Thus untrustworthy businessmen cannot abuse the 
cooperative and flexible norms and customs which normally govern NGFA 
trade.
3.3 Law, Social Norms and Efficiency
One of the big debates concerning social norms and law is their relative – 
and mutual – efficiency in governing contractual (and other) relationships. 
The first thing to note is that law is certainly not irrelevant. Hernando de 
Soto explains how the lack of legal contract enforcement impedes business in 
the informal economy of Peru.16 When business is conducted without legal 
permits, businessmen are forced to rely on a range of non-legal mechanisms 
to mitigate lack of legal enforcement. For example, they cultivate long-term 
friendships; avoid large deals with individuals trading partners; invest time 
in investigating and monitoring the other party; or deal only with relatives 
or people from the same region. Sometimes the informal communities even 
16 De Soto 1989, chapter 5.
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organize collective dispute resolution bodies, and violence (or threats) may 
be used as a last alternative.
The difference between the informal economy in Peru and business in Eu-
rope and United States is one of degree only. Nevertheless, it seems im-
plausible to say that social norms are enough without law. Indeed, de Soto’s 
analysis of the underground economy in Peru reveals that when the law is 
not available, people resort to mechanisms which imitate the judicial and 
policing powers of the state, thereby creating quasi-states within the state.
The question that remains concerns the optimal role and importance of law 
vis-à-vis informal social norms. Robert Cooter posits that legal and social 
norms do their job most efficiently when they are well aligned together, such 
that they support each other.17 The idea is not that law and social norms 
should mirror each other, but that they should complement each other. 
Cooter explains:
”In a developing economy with relatively free trade, business will 
tend to develop efficient norms to regulate private interactions. In 
these circumstances, the role of state law can be limited to correcting 
failures in the market for norms. Failures tend to occur because pri-
vate, informal punishment insufficiently deters wrongdoing. In these 
circumstances, state enforcement of social norms can increase private 
cooperation and production. However, successful state enforcement 
typically requires a close alignment of law with morality, so state of-
ficials enjoy informal support from private persons.”18
The challenge seems to be that of finding the right balance and mixture be-
tween social norms and law. Without any law, the “law of the jungle” may 
prevail, but over-legalization and over-regulation are also harmful.19 Accord-
ing to Cooter, legal centralism – and consequent over-regulation – is one of 
the reasons why law and social norms get out of alignment.
17 Cooter 2000.
18 Ibid., pp. 243–244.
19 See for example Pildes 1996.
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However, not all legal scholars are as enthusiastic as Cooter about social 
norms. In his classic work The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart drew the dis-
tinction between law and custom.20 He defined law as a union of “primary 
rules” (which control people and behavior) and “secondary rules” (which 
control the application and amendment of rules). Custom, according to 
Hart, does not have secondary rules, and as a consequence, it is inflexible 
and not under anyone’s rational control. Thus, it would seem, law can be 
used to reform unworkable or old-fashioned social norms. In a more recent 
paper, Eric Posner gives a general critique of the idea that social norms are 
inherently more efficient than legal rules.21 The basic point is similar to 
Hart’s: social norms may not be so rational, and law can improve the situ-
ation by regulating behavior rationally and by providing more systematic 
sets of rules.
Posner is surely right: it would be senseless to say that law has no role to 
play in shaping and complementing social norms. However, it is hard to say 
where to draw the line. It can be difficult to say exactly when social norms 
are working well enough and when law should play a more important role. 
The dire consequences of over-legalization of the society are probably only 
seen after many years. Moreover, in many cases law cannot easily amend 
unworkable or harmful social norms. Take the case of Taiwan22, or almost 
any “developing” country: there is a strong path-dependency and interac-
tion between formal and informal institutions.
There are additional reasons to be cautious. Robert Cooter argues in an 
earlier paper, quite surprisingly, that sometimes it is easier to change custom 
than to change law.23 Law depends on political processes, which entail costly 
procedures and special interests; custom depends on social consensus, which 
can be more flexible in some circumstances. Cooter goes so far as to say that 
“Hart’s critique of custom resembles a socialist’s critique of markets”24. There 
may be more to that argument than meets the eye: David Charny believes 
that methodological commitments influence one’s attitude toward social 
20 Hart 1961.
21 Posner 1996.
22 See Winn 1994.
23 Cooter 1996.
24 Ibid., p. 1655.
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norms.25 On the one hand, there is the neoclassical tradition of economics, 
which highlights market failures and largely believes in government’s ability 
to improve matters efficiently. On the other hand, the Hayekian tradition 
shows that imperfect information makes central planning difficult if not 
impossible, whereas the analysis of decentralized coordination demonstrates 
that markets are not so irrational after all.
However, Charny is skeptical about the entire project of “normative analy-
sis” of social norms and law. As he puts it: “There are simply too many 
unobservable variables, particularly those that bear on the ‘noneconomic’ 
motivations and preferences that must play a role in the start-up and the ef-
fectiveness of complex sanctioning systems.”26 Therefore it may be better to 
focus on trying to understand these phenomena and avoid arguing in terms 
of arm-chair generalities.
4 Implications and Challenges
The theory of law and social norms presents a host of interesting impli-
cations and directions for further research. For example, one fashionable 
topic in economics today is the theory of incomplete contracts.27 According 
to this strand of research, contracts never specify all the possible contingen-
cies and the responses to them. Reasons for this include that it is impossible 
to predict and calculate the probability of certain contingencies, while it is 
often impracticable and expensive to negotiate on them. The theory of in-
complete contracts emphasizes the allocation of property rights as a way of 
dealing with contractual incompleteness: ownership rights function as the 
residual for whatever is not included in the contract. However, the theory 
and evidence of social norms shows that the standard analysis of incom-
plete contracts is plainly misleading: contracts do not exist in a normative 
vacuum. There are other norms that facilitate cooperation in the absence 
of contractually agreed provisions. Moreover, businessmen often prefer in-
formal governance of relationships to legal and contractual planning. The 
25 Charny 1996.
26 Ibid., p. 1858.
27 See Oliver Hart 1995, Salanié 1997.
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theory of social norms therefore challenges the background assumptions of 
the economic theory of incomplete contracts.
The relationship between legal and social norms is important for practical 
reasons too. For example, Cooter notes that unproductive and uncoopera-
tive behavior can sometimes be prevented through private enforcement.28 
In practice, public enforcement through law may be necessary, but legal 
enforcement is expensive, and it is important that it is complemented by so-
cial norms which punish antisocial behavior. On the other hand, law plays 
an important role in influencing social norms, because law has an expressive 
function: laws relating to environmental regulation, tobacco smoking, drug 
use etc. can have powerful effects on public perceptions and expectations.29
Understanding the role of social norms may be especially important for 
policy-making in developing countries. Mainstream development econom-
ics emphasizes institutional reform, but this is understood in the context of 
formal institutions: electoral systems, law courts, the regulation of police, 
enforcement of contracts and private property, etc. These are all important 
issues, but often the question remains: how to achieve all of that in prac-
tice? Legal transplants from Western countries do not necessarily produce 
the desired effects, because the social norms and informal institutions can 
be very different. Edgardo Buscaglia argues that, without the alignment of 
legal and social norms, one does not get compliance and efficiency.30 IPR 
protection in China provides a topical example: although the central gov-
ernment seems to be making an effort to enforce Western-style patents and 
copyrights, the practice in regional courts and other public instances can be 
different, because Chinese attitudes towards Western rights and privileges 
are influenced by many factors other than formal legal provisions alone.31
28 Cooter 2000.
29 Cooter 2000 gives an amusing example. A new law in California requires dog-walkers 
to clean up the poop. Earlier, people did not complain much about dog poop, but after 
the new law, they do if someone breaks the law. It is easier to say “obey the law” than 
“don’t be so rude.” This is understandable: when a standard of behavior is included 
in the law, it has the moral backing of the legitimate public authorities of the com-
munity.
30 Buscaglia 2000.
31 See for example Fung 1996 and Allison and Lin 1999.
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However, much work remains to be done before full enlightenment. Some 
authors have noted the need for a more consistent and holistic theory of 
norms. The greatest challenge seems to be that of making sense of the 
internal (or subjective) dimension while uniting it to the external (or ob-
jective) dimension of norms. In his influential work, Douglass C. North 
has argued that the biggest challenge in creating good social and political 
institutions is how to create the conditions for just government and law 
enforcement. Formal political constitutions seem to make relatively little 
difference empirically speaking, and North therefore believes that internal 
norms are central to our understanding of this issue, but we do not seem 
to have any consensus on what they are and how they are formed and 
shaped.32
Lawrence Mitchell criticizes the new “norms jurisprudence” for accepting 
too much of the behavioral and positivistic attitude of modern social sci-
ence and especially economics. He argues that the approach taken by the 
leading authors ends up distorting instead of improving the explanation of 
norms, because they “generally share the same basic goal, which is to estab-
lish a non-normative theory of norms. [...] They tend to share an underly-
ing metanorm of efficient wealth or welfare maximization, and all share 
the basic belief that people are motivated principally—if not solely—by 
self-interest. Most important, by limiting their inquiry to what they see, 
they are unable to explain, except at the most superficial level, how norms 
become normative—that is, how they come to tell us what we ought (or 
ought not) to do.”33
5 Conclusions
This article has reviewed some of the empirical and theoretical literature 
on social norms and law. It would be interesting to see some discussion – 
and investigation – of their relationships in Finnish society and business 
practice.34 Given the enormous importance of non-legal norms and govern-
ance mechanisms in contractual relationships, it might also not be entirely 
32 See North 1990.
33 Mitchell 1999, pp. 208–209.
34 A step in this direction is taken in Nystén-Haarala 1998.
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unwise to put more importance to them in legal education. As Alexis de 
Tocqueville once mused: “Laws are always unsteady when unsupported by 
mores; mores are the only tough and durable power in a nation.”35
35 Cited in Gregg 2003, p. 54.
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